This article investigates religious ideals persistent in the datafication of information society. Its nodal point is Thomas Bayes, after whom Laplace names the primal probability algorithm. It reconsiders their mathematical innovations with Laplace's providential deism and Bayes' singular theological treatise. Conceptions of divine justice one finds among probability theorists play no small part in the algorithmic data-mining and microtargeting of Cambridge Analytica. Theological traces within mathematical computation are emphasized as the vantage over large numbers shifts to weights beyond enumeration in probability theory. Collateral secularizations of predestination and theodicy emerge as probability optimizes into Bayesian prediction and machine learning. The paper revisits the semiotics and theism of Peirce and a

Subject and object have switched places. The sites, the apps, the ubiquitous platforms: Computers run the show now and we—mere data subjects […] work and worship them […] our ontic exhaust powering the megacorporate machinery. Perhaps the inevitability of the reversal was always there, coded in the words.

[T]he more religious our views are, the more probable they become.

Although the Italian mathematician Paolo Zellini refrains from overt espousal of genealogical inquiry by name, in

From problems posed by the gods stems the basis of a way of thinking without which modern mathematics would be inconceivable. We can identify the reason behind this persistent link between divine and human orders, between foundational propositions of the gods and modern mathematics […]. The connection is [subtle and involves] the most technical and secret operations of calculation, the fundamental paradigms on which algebra and analysis are still based today.

My project allies itself with these lines as guiding tenets. The current essay endeavors to practice them beyond Zellini's initial focus on the Axial Era. It suspects that such an admixture between calculation and religion continues into algorithmic computation and statistical mathematics. This is more readily discernible as computation and mathematics are developed by thinkers within the Abrahamic religious tradition: algebraic formulation in Islam and a theistic element that seems indissociable with probability theory. The article emphasizes theological traces in the vantage over large numbers that exceed enumeration in probability theory, which further suggests collateral secularizations of predestination and theodicy as it optimizes into Bayesian algorithms and machine learning.

It begins by revisiting the Weberian critique and Protestant traces at play in the recent present. It insists that these are foundational to the data mining by Cambridge Analytica. I revisit the emendation of Calvin by Barth, probability in Peirce, Bayes, Laplace, and Whitehead, and critiques of providence in Agamben and Foucault. Returning to Nietzsche, I close in considering datafication in terms of valuation, for better and worse. The article suggests that religiosity remains encoded within the very algorithms presumed purified by technoscientific secularity or mathematical dispassion.

One might return to supplementing Foucauldian problematization with the later works of Habermas and noting gestures by both thinkers to Barth.

What is at stake? If through the course of inquiry genealogy finds itself drawn into re-weighing the "Weberian set of problems of economic history and sociology,"

If we believe Weber, it would seem that the enrichment of an individual in sixteenth century Protestant Germany was a sign of God's arbitrary election of that individual […]. In twentieth century Germany, an individual's enrichment will be a sign […] not, of course, of God's election, [but] the daily sign of the adherence of individuals to the state.

Even as god disappears through secularizations of religious behavior into twentieth century economic practices, it is yet worth considering that this electoral regime remains in its transformation to state adherence. Weber suggests something even more peculiar to Protestant culture than its econo-rationality when he writes: "Even more are parliaments of

Protestant electoral regimes remain peculiar. Today the entanglements between providence, algorithms, predestination, and probability reemerge in the digital politics of information society through this mode of belief by microtargeting.

In earlier years of development in Michigan, Gage's larval method aided the gubernatorial campaign of George Romney, ex-Mormon missionary to the UK and father of Mitt.

Critical inquiry must keep in mind these contextual kinds of data clusters and the inherited foundational traits inherent to them that, then, further compound, correlate, and optimize through the course of their development from Arkansas to Michigan to the Bush White House. All this is years in the making before microtargeting methods and techniques are adopted in fuller development by the hyper-personalization tactics of the online Obama campaigns and eventually Cambridge Analytica (CA). Before CA was created, the test case and proof of concept the SCL Group pitched to Bannon and the Mercer family was performed in Virginia, which "has an enormous bloc of evangelical Christian voters," after buying access to their information through "Acxiom, and niche firms with specialist lists from evangelical churches."

It is no secret that adherence to a simple majority fails to decide recent elections. Scales are tipped by a mere few to a consensus or plurality. A slight yet decisive few value-up the increasingly customary split-decision between two-party systems. Only scant numbers are needed, merely a micron. The microtargeting deployed by CA exploits personal fears and is highly effective with those predisposed to believing themselves chosen. It targets "beliefs and religiosity," specifically "whether [voters] believe they control their own destiny."

CA then discovered that for those with evangelical worldviews in particular, a 'just world' exists because God rewards people with success if they follow his rules […]. Cambridge Analytica began feeding these cohorts narratives with an expanded religious valence. "

Taking aim at personal dispositions to a just world

How did this happen? True to his Nietzschean roots, Barth's critique of predestination in §32 of the

How could things have been otherwise? Barth revaluates predestination as grace granted prior

These latter two policies are articulated in probability theory from its inception. Before citizens were datafied and algorithms deployed to inform or misinform microtargets, the political ambition of probability was to minimize biased passions and misinformed opinion. Laplace endeavors to apply Bayes' theorem to "decisions of assemblies," which depend not only on "the plurality of votes [but] the impartiality of the"

Bayesian influences on Laplacean politics would not only derive from Bayes' mathematical

For the most happy universe is

Bayes arguably offers a revaluation of Calvin centuries prior to Barth's genealogy. This is a doctrine of election "not" by "only" a chosen number rejecting greater or lesser remains, but rather a layering of ranked numerical degrees. One might even detect here—prior to Laplace—a schematic tabulation of an actual ranked-voting ballot (or at least a collateral tabulation of its results) initiated by the namesake of the primal probability algorithm,

The previous section suggests ways by which electoral politics in datafied information society can exploit religious convictions (theodicy and predestination) by way of algorithmic computation (data-mining and Cambridge Analytica's probabilistic simulation/prediction of electoral behavior patterns). This section further inquires into the roles of religion and theology within the mathematical development of algorithms. The tenets of admixture by Zellini stated at the beginning of this article are adopted by the Italian biologist and mathematician, Giuseppe Longo. Longo maintains Zellini's position that mathematics is "shaped by metaphysical debate" from Euclid and Aristotle to Aquinas. Critical inquiry must ask, along with Longo, "how [was metaphysics] picked up by Mathematics" as a discursive object and proof component?

Although algorithmic techniques are arguably already at work in ancient Mesopotamia,

To solve these problems, al Khwarizmi invented the new mathematical notion of 'shay,' the Arabic word for 'the thing,' 'the unknown,' […] which applied to arithmetical and geometric quantities alike […]. Schools for jurisprudence […] were developed to (re)construct civil laws about will, inheritance and distribution according to the instructions of Quran. These often needed a complicated calculation […]. [A] al Khwarizmi not only further developed and put such calculations on strong,

The "nature of God's knowledge among early Muslim theologians [e.g., Zaydî Sulaymân] led to the assumption that it was a 'thing' (

Algorithmization by shays is initially formulated to resist idolatrous tendencies to the dead letter of the law—written symbology—indicative of Abrahamic religions (and monotheisms more broadly). It aspires to iconicity against potential misuse as idolatry. The algebraic capacity to find correlations beyond individuated shay punctuality applied to correlates learnable by human machines, but nevertheless correlated to truths designated distinctively to divine reckoning. Islami and Longo make little direct reference to the Qu'ran. Noteworthy is a divine practice of meticulous book-keeping

Al Khwarizmi's "method […] facilitated a new form of 'physical abstraction' […] of great importance in the scientific revolution"

This mathematical infinity through mariological imaging "is a tool for the intelligibility of the world."

[S]o-called transcendental idealism of the Anglo-Hegelian school [e.g., Royce] has greatly influenced the […] protestant ministry. It is pantheistic, and [has] blunted […] traditional theism in protestantism […].

This Anglo-Hegelianism would include Peirce.

The perspectival problem persists in the multiple dimensions of statistical vectorization. After Longo's introduction of the religious undertones at play in the prehistory of mathematical development, it is perhaps not surprsing to find that the statistical machine learning described by Mackenzie also follows a methodical chosenness (appointment of a

One discerns the legacy of thing semblance by algorithmic shays in Peirce's icon. "Anything […] is an Icon of anything, [but only] insofar as it is

The qualitative distinction between Islamic law and its notation is maintainable in Peirce since an icon refers to its object, "whether any such Object actually exists or not."

Such mathematical reasoning might describe how the function of a shay, icon, or algorithm is a pragmatic practice of delimited human reason applied to creaturely existence distinct from whatever those elements may mean to divine reason (if anything, and, as such, resists idolizing its own capacities as anything resembling conceptions of gods). One discerns influences of both al Khwarizmi's algorithmic ambition against idolatry and expectant human judgments in Bayesian

Peirce is outspoken and confessional about his theism.

Peirce's concern with god attempts to distinguish itself from religion. In "The Approach to Metaphysics" he suggests scientific curiosity much analogous to theology and regrets the religious tendencies of theologians to devolve into an "army [of] sworn fidelity."

This section follows a certain "Whitehead revival"

For Whitehead, Laplacean physics of efficient causation embodies a potentiality that is yet "the correlative of [a prior] 'givenness.' The meaning of 'givenness' is that what

The notion of 'probability,' in the widest sense of that term, presents a puzzling philosophical problem. The mathematical theory […] is based upon certain statistical assumptions […]. But it is not easy to understand how the statistical theory can apply to all cases to which the notion […] is habitually applied […]. [W]e seem to be influenced by

This is a legitimation crisis in the very foundations of decision theory. For "where there is no decision […] there is no givenness."

Mathematical application remains probability's proper horizon. Whitehead claims that any "ultimate ground" to equiprobability (e.g., that any of the six sides of a die may land face up, all six being equally probable) must be "explicable without reference to any notion of probability."

A given, understood as "not merely 'probable,'" invites alternative considerations of datafication that might be worth trying to salvage (akin to the Nietzschean ambition towards revaluation). The "alternative non-statistical ground"

The process occurs between "every creature" and the order "constituting the primordial nature of God."

Whitehead's "given" gradually grows into a god of process theology nearly synonymous with his very name. Reminiscent of

Whitehead evokes god without forfeiting mathematical probability, a Pascalian insight, rearticulated in Ramsey

To give a brief sketch, the remaining sections of this article attempt to employ key motifs in Whitehead's critique of probability as they apply to three exemplary practitioners of genealogy: Foucault, Agamben, and Nietzsche. It will return to the latter keeping in mind a given beyond the merely probable. But these next two sections address Foucault and Agamben attending to problems of political theology alongside evaluative envisagement.

The envisagement of Whitehead converges with a supra-historical perspective overviewing from a site of truth described in Foucault's "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." The opening section, above, suggested ways by which the algorithmic microtargeting of Cambridge Analytica deployed information tailored to recipients whose statistical psychography identified a significant probability of religious interpretations of the just world hypothesis. In the political aftermath of its efficacy, it is perhaps not surprising to recall that theodicy has always been one of genealogy's primary targets. Foucault suggests that it seems prone to inhibit any genealogical thinking at all.

As he explains that no "genealogy of values" should ever be confused "with a quest for their 'origins,"

But the genealogical overcoming of outdated theogony is perhaps premature. Given time, the emergence of probability ushers in a reemergence of this strange song anticipating the coming of "an optimal Bayesian agent."

If we do go on to create our own ancestor-simulations […] we would therefore have to conclude that we live in a simulation. […] [W]e would have to suspect that the posthumans running our simulation are themselves simulated beings; and their creators, in turn, may also be simulated beings.

Reality may thus contain many levels. Even if it is

In some ways, the posthumans running a simulation are like gods […]; they are of superior intelligence; they are 'omnipotent' […]; they are 'omniscient' […]; all the demigods except those at the fundamental level of reality are subject to sanctions by the more powerful gods living at lower levels.

Further ruminations on these themes could climax in a

Foucault suggests that

With new theogony, new theodicy soon follows. Articulations of such societal rationalization are legion in current discourse. Its popularity alone warrants critical scrutiny. A recent example proclaims:

It becomes difficult to distinguish the old internalized rationales of Calvin and Leibniz from the bleeding-edge probabilistic weighting functions of Cambridge Analytica or "what [Steve] Bannon called

Foucault invokes the theodicy of any such panoptic perspective with apocalyptic derision. The tacit theodicy of "the historian's history […] pretends to base its judgments on an apocalyptic objectivity."

A differing of values emerges by violent appropriations of a "system of rules […] in order to

It is difficult to imagine a more explicit codification of causal reversal than

[W]hat we usually know is the probability of the effects given the cause [P(cause | effect)],

Its statistical application reverse-engineers from given data collected by past empirical experience to predict probabilities of future events, to infer inversely from effects observed to causes of their probable repetitions to come. The "devotion [of Bayesians] to this idea is near religious."

Bayes is not the first to think from effect to cause. He is a Protestant parrot. Calvin rarely gets the credit he deserves for this contribution to intellectual history. The

As evoked in the first section on elections, above, prior to Bayes' watershed

My opening sections focused on entanglements of Protestantism with politics, providence, and probability. The previous section emphasized Whitehead's critique of statistical deployments of probability by way of a given beyond the probable and the envisagement of god. This section closes upon consideration that Calvin and Bayes are perhaps complicit in the kind of reversal of cause and effect, which Foucault suggests originates in the implicit theogony assumed from a supra-historical perspective and indissociable with theodicy. We move into the next section anticipating that, as Agamben attempts to further develop Foucault's critique, he notes the special perspective of governance and providence. This develops into his own confrontation with probability.

Foucault's supplementary adoption of Nietzsche's genealogical method into critiques of theogony and theodicy sets the stage for Agamben's idiomatic adoption of Foucauldian notions of governmentality and biopower into a critical mode of political theology deployed as genealogical inquiry. Agamben revisits Foucault's encounter with Aquinas in

Modern science's image of the world has often been opposed to the theological concept of providential government of the world. However, in their conceptual structure they are more similar than we customarily think. […] [T]he model of general providence is based on eternal laws that are entirely analogous to those of modern science. […] [F]rom Hume to Adam Smith, a concept arises that, in a perfect analogy with the theory of providence, breaks with the primacy of final causes and replaces them with an order produced by the contingent game of immanent effects.

Here, Agamben's "perfect analogy" reiterates Whitehead's previous suspicion that statistical probability is "influenced by some analogy."

But Foucault had already twice invoked problems of providence in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." That which Nietzsche indicts as

Probability is beyond the scope of Agamben's

Agamben notes that Pascal insists on an interruption of a game for the sake of predictive calculation. This demands a state of suspension, deploying governmentality through which the game of politics is revealed: "This means that probability is never punctually realized [but] it allows us to intervene in reality, as considered

[I]t is precisely the exclusively probabilistic character of the phenomena of quantum physics that authorizes the investigator's intervention, […] "commanding" the phenomenon itself to move in a certain direction, […] justifying the intervention of the investigator as inevitable.

Probabilistic science no longer seems "to know reality, but […] only intervene in it in order to govern it."

Well before jurists began to formulate [the paradigm of modern government's] first elements, philosophers and theologians had already elaborated its canon in the doctrine of providential

The effectual ontology of

As humans initially create god in their own image, they come to operate and encode algorithms in god's image. This is the political theology of probability and the secularized theodicy of machine learning. Theodicy had claimed that only god's special perspective might discern the overall glory and benevolence of creation (imperceptible or incomprehensible to the stunted perspective of temporal creatures). This becomes the popular operation of rationalizing evil or suffering by formulation of the just world hypothesis. Such justifications extrapolate probabilistic recreations of realities in images naively presumed to be merely human yet ever encrypted as a god. Political government, genealogically enabled by divine

If Whitehead's evaluative process, discussed above, falls short of Nietzschean revaluation, it at least endeavors to correct upward toward something akin to it. Nietzsche's transvaluation of values arguably marks the instauration of genealogical inquiry. Twenty-first century humanity finds itself living through new experiences of

Today the human machine is dangerously displaced and supplemented with a "digital

Following Foucault's first step in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," it is instructive to revisit the preface to the

Statistics also gives way to value inversions: "[C]ontrary to what the etymology of the unfortunate term 'data' suggests, very few 'data' are actually 'given.'"

Nietzsche's critical legacy persists in enabling us to articulate resistances to the transvaluation of data. The optimization of algorithmic probability through the 20th and 21st centuries remains ever unsettled by philosophical countercurrents. These often come about under the name of phenomenology (even when critical of it). The scientisms under critique by such countercurrents expand their datafying techniques at the turn of the century after the information explosion, cloud-computing, proliferation of online social mediation, and unparalleled computational infopowers set in motion in the early 1900s.

This section suggests that Nietzsche's introduction of the dangers of transvaluation by way of a primal problematization of values given as factual might perhaps still have much to teach us about the current datafication operations proliferating our everyday lives. It is worth considering that the "new datum" of valuation articulated by Whitehead, above, discloses possible datafication processes worth embracing in critical resistance to the transvaluative tendencies formulated through statistical probability, big data, or surveillance and platform capitalisms.

The epigraph from the editors of

Such indifference is presumed indifferent to creaturely effects. A Christian conception of effectiveness survives the Abrahamic transition to Islam, the theopolitics and legalism of which are indissociable from the advent of algebra and algorithms as articulated by al Khwarizmi. The innovation of projective geometry Longo finds in religious paintings sets the stage for the statistical correlations made operational from the perspective of a chosen point in the virtual dimensions of vectoral cyberspace made visibile to machine learning, critically explained by Mackenzie. Mathematical, scientific, and pragmatist critiques can be found that all insist on the importance of not dismissing the theistic or religious undertones that develop over time into modern algorithmic techniques. The pragmatist probability of Peirce articulates itself in collateral critiques of religious predestination and scientistic determinism. This is echoed by Whitehead insisting on a non-statistical givenness prior to and beyond the merely probable. I suggest that this is a mathematical iteration of the electing grace prior to providence in Barth. The nearly Nietzschean valuations enabled by the given in Whitehead are founded on the envisagement of god. Mathematical probability, as such, is equally enabled to move beyond any chosen religion without forfeiting the concept of god. The more the concept of god is dismissed to the whims of religion, the more religious sentiments remain exploitable as microtargets prone to believing themselves chosen.

Religious conceptions of envisagement assume the supra-historical perspective critiqued by Foucault in terms of providence and theogony. These function through a reversal of causation associated with religious conceptions of an afterlife. But causal reversal must also be considered at work in both the mathematical probability calculus of Bayes' theorem derived from the

Just as there is no human lifeform that is not to some extent cyborg, there is no algorithm indemnified from some element of humanity. Even base-10 decimal enumeration is a byproduct of aleatory evolution into the anthropoid manual anatomy of fingers and thumbs.

It has become commonplace in contemporary critical circles, even in seminaries, to identify the death of god as a distinctly Christian invention.

The Editors, "Fantastic Planet,"

William Paley,

Paolo Zellini,

Zellini,

Zellini,

On bringing together Foucault and Habermas see, for instance, Colin Koopman,

Michel Foucault,

The reason "according to Epictetus [to] forgo marriage" is "the mission of caring for humans […] the whole of humanity." A "renunciation of […]

Cf. the connection between Protestant predestination and the alleged genetics of monogamy critiqued in Giuseppe Longo, "Scientific Thought and Absolutes: for an image of the sciences, between computing and biology,"

In marriage or outside it, humans are called to love: "whether in love and marriage or outside this bond, every [human] should realize that [it] is committed to live […] in this interrelationship, not […] as [one's] own but as being in fellowship." Karl Barth,

Jürgen Habermas,

They are not the only recent critical thinkers who share this interest. See also Jacques Derrida, "Deconstruction in America," trans. James Creech,

Michel Foucault,

Foucault,

Max Weber,

Cf. the political theology of

Adrian Mackenzie,

The term was used prior only in clinical cancer research.

Sasha Issenberg,

Issenberg,

State of Michigan Bureau of Elections, Lansing, "Questions and Answers: Michigan's Presidential Primary," March, 2016,

Issenberg,

Issenberg,

Issenberg,

Janicke Strainer,

J.S. Maloy,

Christopher Wylie,

Attributed to Alexander Nix of CA in a pitch to join the 2018 Mexican presidential campaign, Brittany Kaiser,

Wylie,

The suffix of theo-dicy derives from the Greek word for justice,

Issenberg,

Once developed, its efficacy is not limited Protestant cultures.

Karl Barth,

Blaise Pascal,

Barth,

Barth,

Barth,

Only election "and not […] accompanying non-election or rejection." Barth,

Cf. John Stuart Mill,

Pierre-Simon Laplace,

Laplace,

Laplace,

Laplace,

Laplace,

Laplace,

Laplace,

Laplace,

Recently instituted in the U.S. state of Maine. Maloy,

Dale,

Giuseppe Longo, "Mathematical Infinity '

Zellini,

Arezoo Islami and Giuseppe Longo, "Marriages of Mathematics and Physics: A Challenge for Biology,"

Franz Rosenthal,

Rosenthal,

Cf. Zellini,

Rosenthal,

Roshdi Rashed,

Rashed,

Rashed,

"And when you release their property to them, take witness in their presence; and Allâh is All-Sufficient in taking account." Sura 4:6. Cf. the Hebrew Bible's book of Numbers.

"O Maryam! […] Allâh has chosen you, purified you […] and chosen you above the women of the

Islami and Longo, "Marriages of Mathematics and Physics," 182.

Longo, "Mathematical Infinity," 3.

Longo, "Mathematical Infinity," 3.

Cf. the "column" of Barth,

Adrian Mackenzie,

Longo, "Mathematical Infinity," 5.

Colin Koopman,

Longo, "Mathematical Infinity," 5.

Longo, "Mathematical Infinity," 4.

Longo, "Mathematical Infinity," 11, fn. 3.

Longo, "Mathematical Infinity," 3.

William James,

Charles S. Peirce,

Michel Foucault,

Koopman,

Mackenzie,

Mackenzie,

Mackenzie,

The "curse of dimensionality" described by Richard Bellman, discussed in Mackenzie,

Peirce, "Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs,"

Peirce,

Peirce,

Peirce,

Peirce,

Peirce,

Peirce,

Peirce, "The Concept of God," in

Peirce,

Peirce, "On the Doctrine of Chances," "The Probability of Induction," "The General Theory of Probable Inference," in

Peirce,

Peirce,

Cf. Barth,

Peirce,

Peirce, "Gospel of greed," in

Peirce,

Dale,

Peirce,

Peirce,

Peirce,

Peirce, "The Concept of God," in

Peirce,

M. Beatrice Fazi,

Steven Shaviro,

A foundational presupposition Russell and Whitehead identify as necessary to ground deduction and symbolic logic in the

Alfred North Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Dale,

John Maynard Keynes,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

Whitehead,

F.P. Ramsey,

Importantly, this is only one of several valences attributable to the term 'envisagement' in Whitehead.

Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 78.

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 79. The suffix of

Nick Bostrom,

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 82.

Nick Bostrom, "Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?"

Cf. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 81. Cf. "the fall of the devil shows "[…]" that the causation is reversed." Adam Kotsko,

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 82; italics added. Following Foucault's critique of whatever an afterlife might be, Bostrom insists on naturalistic and physical layers, but no less simulated by their physicality, that he assumes purified from religiosity. But he concedes the effectuated semblance: "[I]f nobody can be sure that they are at the basement-level [reality] then everybody would have to consider the possibility that their actions will be rewarded or punished […]. An

Mark Zuckerberg, quoted in Steven Levy,

Wylie,

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 82.

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 82.

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 86–7.

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 87.

G.W.F. Hegel,

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 81; "Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire," in

Edwin Black,

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 86; italics added.

Pedros Domingos,

Domingos,

Domingos,

Domingos,

John Calvin,

Dale,

Dale,

Dale,

Dale,

Cf. Michel Foucault,

Agamben,

Agamben,

Agamben,

Giorgio Agamben,

Ian Hacking,

Agamben,

Whitehead,

Agamben,

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 88–9.

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 92.

Agamben,

Hacking,

Hacking,

Agamben,

Agamben,

Agamben,

Agamben,

Giorgio Agamben,

Agamben,

Agamben,

Norbert Wiener,

Bernard E. Harcourt,

Natasha Dow Schüll, "Self in the Loop: Bits, Patterns, and Pathways in the Quantified Self," in

Jean-Luc Marion,

John Cheney-Lippold,

Cheney-Lippold,

Gilbert Simondon,

Helga Nowotny,

Alexander Nix of Cambridge Analytica ["we"] referring to data ["it"] made available to Leave.EU Brexiters ["they"]. Kaiser,

Friedrich Nietzsche,

Alain Desrosières, "How Real are Statistics?"

Desrosières, "How Real are Statistics?," 353.

Foucault,

Nietzsche,

Charles Taylor,

Nowotny,

Nowotny,

Koopman,

Nick Srnicek,

Cf. the second epigraph above from Paley,

Wiener,

Wiener,

Wiener,

Wiener,

Peirce, "Pragmatism in Retrospect: A Last Formulation," in

Especially in its Nietzschean or Hegelian articulations, which are not the only ways to try to think it. Christian roots are suggested of secularity itself in Marcel Gauchet,

This work is a part of the research project "Paradoxes of Theological Turns in Contemporary Culture," Univerzita Karlova, Praha, PRIMUS/HUM/23.